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THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE: THE NEED FOR
A COMMERCIAL EXCEPTION IN
ANTITRUST LITIGATION*
When successfully asserted, the act of state defense bars inquiry
into the actions of a foreign government. This Comment traces
the evolution of the act of state doctrine in a commercial context,
focusing on antitrust litigation. The author concludes that the
commercial and extraterritorial nature of most or the majority of
antitrust actions and the detrimental effect of the broad applica-
tion of the act of state doctrine on current federal legislation
mandate a commercial exception to the doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
The classic enunciation of the act of state doctrine can be found
in Underhill v. Hernandez' in which Justice Fuller stated: "Every
sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the goverment of another done within its
own territory."2
This Comment will examine various arguments in support of a
commercial exception to the act of state doctrine. In particular,
the argument that the commercial exception is appropriate in an-
titrust litigation. The nature of antitrust violations will be ana-
lyzed to show why the act of state doctrine should not apply in
those situations. An alternative approach to the commercial ex-
ception put forth by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America3 will also be ana-
* The Author deeply appreciates the assistance of Mr. Guillermo Marrero of
Gray, Cary, Ames and Frye, San Diego, California, in the preparation of this Com-
ment.
1. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
2. Id. at 252. In this case the Court refused to inquire into the acts of Her-
nandez, a Venezuelan military commander whose government had been later rec-
ognized by the United States. Underhill, an American citizen, claimed that he had
been unlawfully assaulted, coerced, and detained in Venezuela by Hernandez.
3. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
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lyzed. The Timberlane analysis will be developed as a viable al-
ternative to the commercial acts exception.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The act of state doctrine is a judicial creation, required neither
by the Constitution nor international law.4 The roots of the doc-
trine may be discerned in the 1674 English case of Blad v.
Blamfield.5 Its emergence in the United States occurred in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.6 The early doctri-
nal basis was the concept of comity among nations.V In effect, the
actions of the foreign state were being judged solely by the laws
of that state.8 The doctrine may be asserted as an affirmative de-
fense by either a foreign sovereign or a private party.9 If success-
fully asserted, the act of state defense will preclude inquiry into
the details of an action of the foreign government, or the merits of
the result it has reached, in action by it upon the subject matter
of the litigation.O
The first major United States Supreme Court case to utilize the
act of state doctrine in an antitrust" suit was American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co. 12 Both parties to the action were Ameri-
can corporations. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had in-
duced the Costa Rican Government to seize the plaintiffs
plantation and banana supplies with the intent of establishing a
monopoly in the banana trade. Justice Holmes concluded that
the acts of the defendant could not be declared illegal in an Amer-
ican court. This was because, to find the defendant's acts illegal,
the court would initially be required to adjudicate the legality of
the Costa Rican seizure, an action which could not be scrutinized
under the act of state doctrine.13
4. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-23 (1964).
5. 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (1674).
6. See Schooner Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135-36 (1812), and
Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat) 283, 336 (1822).
7. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
8. For further explanation of this "conflict of laws" rationale see American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
9. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). See notes 14-17 and ac-
companying text infra.
10. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918).
11. Here "antitrust" refers to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976), and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976).
12. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
13. "For again, not only were the acts of the defendant in Panama or Costa
Rica not within the Sherman Act, but they were not torts by the law of the place
and therefore were not torts at all. . . ." Id. at 357. The case was also dismissed
on a jurisdictional argument which was based on the theory that the acts at issue
were performed outside the United States and therefore were not subject to con-
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The fundamental reason [for the Court's refusal to question the acts of
the Costa Rican Government] is that it is a contradiction in terms to say
that within its jurisdiction it is unlawful to persuade a sovereign power to
bring about a result that it declares by its conduct to be desirable and
proper.... The very meaning of sovereignty is that the decree of the sov-
ereign makes law.1 4
The next case, Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,15 involved a
seizure of hides from a Mexican citizen as a military levy for the
forces of General Carranza, whose government was subsequently
recognized by the United States.16 The plaintiff claimed owner-
ship of the seized hides as assignee of the Mexican citizen. The
defendant claimed title to the hides through a third party who
had purchased the hides from the General enforcing the levy. In
affrming a judgement for the defendant, the Court extended the
act of state doctrine to disputes arising between two private
parties.
The Court articulated another doctrinal basis for the act of state
defense in Oetjen. "To permit the validity of the acts of one sov-
ereign State to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the
courts of another would very certainly 'imperil the amicable rela-
tions between governments and vex the peace of nations.' "17 Be-
cause the sovereignty of General Carranza's forces had been
recognized by the United States Government, the Court con-
cluded the adjudication of the acts of the General's forces would
certainly interfere with the foreign relations powers invested in
the executive and legislative branches. In designating the issue a
political question, the concept of separation of powers emerged as
a second basis for the act of state doctrine.
Ricaud v. American Metal Co. 18 arose out of the same circum-
stances as Oetjen, except it was an American citizen whose prop-
erty was confiscated by General Carranza's forces. The
gressional scrutiny. Justice Holmes stated that the determination of whether an
act is lawful or unlawful must be determined "wholly by the law of the country
where the act is done." Id. at 356. This analysis has been subsequently discred-
ited by United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), where
the court found that an agreement among foreign companies in violation of the
Sherman Act was illegal even though the acts complained of occurred abroad, if
the agreement was intended and did in fact affect United States imports.
14. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. at 358.
15. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
16. Interestingly enough, the Government was recognized by this country sub-
sequent to the trial but prior to the decision by the Court.
17. 246 U.S. at 304.
18. 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
importance of Ricaud is the distinction made between the act of
state doctrine and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.19 The doc-
trine of sovereign immunity prevents the assertion of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction by the courts of the United States under certain
circumstances where a foreign state is involved. The act of state
doctrine in contrast,
does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction once acquired over a case. It
requires only that, when it is made to appear that the foreign government
has acted in a given way on the subject-matter of the litigation, the details
of such action or the merit of the result cannot be questioned but must be
accepted by our courts as a rule for their decision.20
The act of state doctrine is judicially created; its definitions and
limitations have remained ambiguous. As American Banana,
Oetjen and Ricaud illustrate, the courts have utilized the ambigu-
ity to excuse themselves from adjudicating cases they consider
politically volatile or undesirable. This judicial practice became
even more apparent with the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Sisal Sales Corp. 21 In Sisal a
number of American corporations faced charges of antitrust viola-
tions arising from the formation of a cartel of Mexican sisal pro-
ducers whose products were purchased by an exclusive American
importer. The establishment of the cartel was greatly aided by
favorable Mexican legislation that was solicited and secured by
the defendants.22 As a defense, Sisal Sales contended that the al-
leged monopoly was created by the laws of a foreign state and
thus could not be the basis of a cause of action within the United
States.23 The Supreme Court held that the defendants could be
enjoined from violating American antitrust laws because the de-
fendants had entered into a conspiracy to monopolize the sisal
business from within the United States and had themselves pro-
19. The American Law Institute's RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW § 41 (1965), distinguished the two concepts. Sovereign immunity is a
defense available to a state when a claim is brought against it in the court of an-
other state. The defense bars consideration of the merits of the claim, including
examination of the act which gave rise to the claim. When a proceeding against a
state or against a thing in its possession is dismissed on the ground of foreign sov-
ereign immunity, it is unnecessary for the court to consider whether the suit could
also be dismissed on the separate ground that the act giving rise to the claim
against the state is an act of state. On the other hand, the act of state doctrine
provides that a court in the United States with appropriate jurisdiction to deter-
mine a claim asserted against a person in the United States or with respect to a
thing located there, or other interest localized there, will refrain from examining
the validity of an act of a foreign state by which that state has exercised its juris-
diction to give effect to its public interests. Id.
20. 246 U.S. at 309.
21. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
22. Id. at 273-74.
23. Id. at 270, 275-76.
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cured the Mexican legislation.2 4
The result in Sisal is difficult to reconcile with American Ba-
nana and its progeny. In both Sisal and American Banana the
gist of the action involved the influencing of a foreign government
to create legislation beneficial to the defendants. 2 5 As with Ameri-
can Banana, Sisal involved action of the foreign government, the
form of which was ostensibly an "act of state."26 Yet in Sisal the
Court created its own jurisdiction by distinguishing the actions of
the defendants on the basis of their conspiring from within the
territorial boundaries of the United States. The distinction is
arguably fictional and is reflective of the broad discretion vested
in courts in deciding whether to invoke or deny the protections af-
forded by the act of state doctrine.
The modern cases dealing with the act of state doctrine limit
the scope of the doctrine by creating exceptions to it.27 In Bern-
stein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaant-Maat-
schappij,28 the Second Circuit reversed its earlier opinion and
held that the Nazi confiscations would not be protected by the act
of state defense. The reason for the court's reversal was a State
Department press release directing the courts to deny the de-
fense.29 The result of the Bernstein decision has become known
as the "Bernstein exception." This exception allows courts to
deny the defense of act of state with the approval of the executive
branch. This decision also illustrates the court's use of the sepa-
ration of powers concept as a basis for the act of state doctrine.
24. Id. at 276.
25. See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra.
26. Furthermore, the arguments of "comity" and separation of powers in
Oetjen and Ricaud would apply in Sisal.
27. The first exception arose in Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe
Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947), where a German Jew brought suit to recover
his property which had been confiscated by the Nazi regime and subsequently
sold to the puchaser-defendant. On appeal Judge Learned Hand felt compelled to
allow the act of state defense to validate the Nazi's actions. The importance of the
opinion was the court's intimation that the existence of a United States policy de-
nying the validity of the decree dispossessing the plaintiff of title might dictate an
opposite result. In addressing executive policy on the matter, Hand said:
Thus the case is cleared for the second question: whether since the cessa-
tion of hostilities with Germany our own Executive, which is the authority
to which we must look for the final word in such matters, has declared
that the commonly accepted doctrine [i.e. the act of state doctrine] which
we have just mentioned, does not apply.
Id. at 249.
28. 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949).
29. Id.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. SabbatinoO is generally accepted
as establishing the modern basis for the act of state doctrine. In
this case, the Cuban Government had expropriated the property
of a Cuban sugar corporation (owned primarily by American in-
terests) in retaliation for the United States' import quota reduc-
tion of Cuban sugar. The ship carrying the sugar was allowed to
leave Cuba only after the American commodity broker entered
into a new contract to purchase the nationalized sugar from an in-
strumentality of the Cuban Government. As assignee of the con-
tract, the Banco Nacional de Cuba brought suit to recover the
proceeds of the sale.31 The Supreme Court speaking through Jus-
tice Harlan reversed the lower courts in holding that the act of
state doctrine applied to Cuba's seizure of the sugar.3 2 In tracing
the historical development of the doctrine the Court rejected the
rationale of American Banana which established "[n]otions of
sovereign authority . . .," and the deference due foreign sover-
eigns, as its basis.33 The Court also rejected the findings of the
lower courts that international law was a source of the rights here
asserted.3 4 The Court noted that the act of state doctrine was
based on neither international nor constitutional law, 35 although
it had "constitutional underpinnings" arising out of the "basic re-
lationships between branches of government in a system of sepa-
ration of powers." 36 Because foreign policy falls within the
purview of the executive branch,3 7 the Court declined to adjudi-
30. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
31. Id. at 406.
32. In granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant Sabbatino, the
district court stated that although ordinarily the act of state doctrine would pre-
vent it from questioning the validity of the Cuban action, the act complained of
violated international law and therefore fell within the court's jurisdiction. 193 F.
Supp. 375, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Owing, in addition to Cuba's retaliatory and dis-
criminatory intent and its improper public purpose, the court reasoned that it was
bound to respect and enforce international law rather than the act of state doc-
trine. Id. at 384-85. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, modifying the de-
cision slightly by declining to hold that any one of the grounds advanced below
would be sufficient by itself to constitute a violation as a whole; however, the court
reasoned that there was a sufficient showing of a violation of international law.
307 F.2d 845, 868 (2d Cir. 1962).
33. 376 U.S. at 421.
34. The Court in Sabbatino reasoned that the vast ideological rift concerning
expropriation of alien property necessitated this holding: 'There are few if any is-
sues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the
limitations on a state's power to expropriate the property of aliens." Id. at 428.
35. Id. at 427.
36. Id. at 423. Note the parallel to Oetjen where the Court held that problems
arising within the context of the act of state doctrine were best determined by the
legislative and executive departments. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text
supra.
37. U.S. CoNsT. art. 11, §§ 2, 3.
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cate such matters.38 The Court reasoned that the executive
branch was best equipped to provide adequate relief for all claim-
ants39 and interference by the judiciary might damage the negoti-
ations being carried on by the executive branch.
40
In redefining the doctrine, the Court sought to avoid an "inflexi-
ble and all-encompassing rule."41 Instead it opted for an ad hoc
approach in which the decision to exercise judgment would result
from the "balance of relevant considerations." 42 These "consider-
ations" included: the degree of codification or consensus concern-
ing a particular area of international law;
43 the possibility of
affronting the foreign nation;44 the implications of the issues
before the Court on United States foreign policy;
45 and whether
the State which perpetrated the challenged act is still in
existence.46
In abandoning the inflexible rule-oriented approach of the act of
state doctrine in favor of an ad hoc balancing of relevant consider-
ations, the Court opened the door to judicial determination of acts
of foreign sovereigns within their own territories. The Court was
able to rationalize this change of approach by altering the doctri-
nal basis of the act of state defense. A separation of powers ra-
tionale is more conducive to scrutinizing acts of a foreign
sovereign than is a rationale based on comity and a resultant pol-
icy of deference to the foreign sovereign's own laws.
The act of state doctrine was again reexamined in First Na-
tional City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba47 but instead of clar-
38. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
39. Following an expropriation of any significance, the Executive engages
in diplomacy aimed to assure that United States citizens who are harmed
are compensated fairly. Representing all claimants of this country, it will
often be able ... to achieve some degree of general redress. Judicial de-
terminations of invalidity of title can, on the other hand, have only an oc-
casional impact....
376 U.S. at 431.
40. "Piecemeal dispositions of this sort involving the probability of affront to
another state could seriously interfere with negotiations being carried on by the
Executive Branch and might prevent or render less favorable the terms of an
agreement that could otherwise be reached." Id. at 432.
41. Id. at 428.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. For further explanation see id. at 432.
45. Id. at 428.
46. Id.
47. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
ifying the Sabbatino decision, the Supreme Court proceeded to
further confuse the problems associated with the doctrine. As
with Sabbatino, First National City Bank arose from an expropri-
ation of American property by Castro in 1960. The majority opin-
ion cited as controlling a State Department letter advising the
Court that the executive branch did not wish the act of state doc-
trine to be applied to bar the counterclaim of First National City
Bank.48 The majority, in effect, found the "Bernstein exception"49
to be the determinative factor, ignoring the Sabbatino balancing
process in favor of treating the act of state doctrine as a "general
rule."15 0 The rationale was separation of powers and the necessity
of judicial deference in the area of foreign affairs.51 Justice Bren-
nan's dissent noted that the Bernstein exception, in effect, abro-
gated the separation of powers between the executive and
judiciary by "requiring blind adherence" of the judiciary to the di-
rections of the executive.52 The dissenters emphasized the exist-
ence of other relevant factors which should be balanced in
making the decision.53
In 1976 the Supreme Court decided Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba.54 The controversy also arose from an
expropriation of assets by the Cuban Government. On Septem-
ber 15, 1960, five Cuban companies which manufactured cigars
were nationalized by the Republic of Cuba.55 At issue was
whether the act of state doctrine encompassed Cuba's refusal to
return payments mistakenly made by Dunhill for cigars
purchased from the expropriated Cuban cigar business.
The majority opinion in Dunhill reflects two separate ap-
proaches to the act of state doctrine. In an opinion written by
Justice White and joined in parts I and II by four other Justices,
the majority found that by definition "act of state" does not en-
compass Cuba's repudiation of its obligation to repay the funds.
"No statute, decree, order, or resolution of the Cuban Govern-
ment itself was offered in evidence indicating that Cuba had...
as a sovereign matter determined to confiscate the amounts due
48. Id. at 767-68.
49. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
50. 406 U.S. at 763.
51. Id. at 767.
52. Id. at 790 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent was joined by Justices
Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun.
53. Id. at 788, 790.
54. 425 U.S. 682 (1976). In Dunhill the Court explicity requested counsel to
brief and argue whether the Court's holding in Sabbatino should be reconsidered.
Id. at 690 n.5.
55. 425 U.S. 682.
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three foreign importers."'56 Instead of an "act of state," the refusal
to return the funds was merely a natural extension of Cuba's liti-
gation stance.5 7
Part III of the majority opinion was endorsed by only four Jus-
tices. In an alternative approach Justice White formulated a
"commercial exception" to the act of state doctrine. "[T]he con-
cept of an act of state should not be extended to include the repu-
diation of a purely commercial obligation owed by a foreign
sovereign or by one of its commercial instrumentalities." 8 This
exception was supported by the separation of powers rationale in
that Justice White was seeking to implement the policies of the
State Department.
In an amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General, a commercial
exception to the act of state doctrine was expressly endorsed.59
In addition, in 1952 the State Department abandoned the absolute
theory of sovereign immunity in favor of the restrictive theory
which denies immunity where commercial acts of a foreign state
are involved.60 Justice White reasoned that to perpetuate the ex-
pansive interpretation of the act of state doctrine would under-
mine the policy of the executive branch and the effect of the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
Repudiation of a commercial debt cannot, consistent with this restrictive
approach to sovereign immunity, be treated as an act of state; for if it
were, foreign governments, by merely repudiating the debt before or after
its adjudication, would enjoy an immunity which our Government would
not extend them under prevailing sovereign immunity principles in this
country.61
56. Id. at 695.
57. Id. at 694-95.
58. Id. at 695.
59. Id. at 696. Also see letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, Dep't of State,
to the Solicitor General (Nov. 26, 1975), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.
v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706 app., 706 (1976).
60. This theory was first advanced by the State Department in the 'Tate let-
ter" in 1952. In this letter, the United States Government abandoned the absolute
theory of sovereign immunity and embraced the restrictive view under which im-
munity in our courts should be granted only with respect to causes of action aris-
ing out of a foreign state's public or governmental actions and not with respect to
those arising out of its commercial activity or proprietary actions. Changed Policy
Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 984 (1952) (letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of Dep't of
State to Phillip B. Pearlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952)) [hereinafter
cited as Tate letter], reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706 app., 711 (1976). Also see notes 18-20 and accompanying text
supra, for distinction between act of state and sovereign immunity doctrines.
61. 425 U.S. at 698-99.
In view of this articulated Executive policy, White maintained
that the role of the court should be limited so as not to embarrass
the executive in its conduct of foreign affairs: "[I]t is therefore
not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has
seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which
the government has not seen fit to recognize."62
Although Dunhill may be viewed as a return to the inflexible
rule-oriented approach of pre-Sabbatino, when considered as part
of the overall trend, it is consistent with the attempt beginning
with Sisal and Bernstein to limit the scope of the act of state doc-
trine.63 Part II of the majority opinion in Dunhill limits the doc-
trine by narrowly defining what constitutes an "act of state." Part
IHI creates the commercial exception-an exception whose con-
tours, although undefined, are potentially vast as nations become
increasingly involved in commercial ventures. Perhaps the most
limiting opinion is that of the dissenters in Dunhill who employed
a balancing approach. Even so, the use of an approach that bal-
ances all of the relevant considerations is flexible and arguably
the commercial nature of the venture is a relevant consideration
in some cases. 64
Subsequent to the broad assertions of Underhill, the Supreme
Court has continually whittled away the protections of the act of
state doctrine. The transition from a comity basis to a separation
of powers rationale has facilitated the process of limiting the
scope of the defense. The concept of comity as a basis required
absolute deference to the acts of foreign sovereigns. In compari-
son, separation of powers focuses on relationships between
branches of government within the United States as opposed to
international relations. Thus the expression of the executive or
legislative branches is given much weight in the courts' determi-
nation. The separation of powers basis does not require the
courts to comply with the expressions of the other branches. The
current application of the act of state doctrine therefore gives the
courts a measure of flexibility not available under the former ap-
proach. The act of state doctrine must now be given definitive
contours to aid lower courts in their application of the doctrine. A
commercial exception to the doctrine would be a natural step in
62. Id. at 699-700. Justice Marshall wrote the dissent in which the remaining
three Justices joined. As with the dissent in Citibank and the majority opinion in
Sabbatino, Marshall rejected the "inflexible rule" approach to the act of state doc-
trine: "[T] he carving out of broad exceptions to the doctrine is fundamentally at
odds with the careful case-by-case approach adopted in Sabbatino." Id. at 728
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. See notes 21-29 and accompanying text supra.
64. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 724 (1976).
Even Justice Marshall in his dissent did not discount such a possibility.
[VOL. 18: 813, 1981] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
that direction and this exception would merely legitimize what is
already a trend in the application of the act of state doctrine.
THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE TO ANTITRUST
VIOLATIONS OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS
A review of the Dunhill case reveals that the commercial excep-
tion is founded upon a distinction between the "public and gov-
ernmental," and the "private and commercial" acts of foreign
governments.65 According to Justice White, acts which are
'"purely commercial" in nature should be denied the protections
of the act of state doctrine.66
Two arguments support the exemption of antitrust cases from
the act of state doctrine. First, the doctrine's rationales are not
served when purely commercial activity is protected from judicial
scrutiny. Second, "act of state" by definition excludes any new
act which can be considered "commercial" from its purview.
A commercial exception is not inconsistent with the policies un-
derlying the act of state doctrine. 67 The concept of comity be-
tween nations is perpetuated by judicial reluctance to pass upon
acts of a foreign state which may infringe upon the sovereignty of
that nation. Commercial dealings of nations are arguably not re-
flective of their political preferences, so that to scrutinize those
dealings would not affront the sovereignty of that nation.68 Sab-
65. Id. at 695.
66. Id. at 706. The support for Justice White's opinion lies in the case of Bank
of the United States v. Planter's Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 904 (1824).
That case involved a suit on promissory notes which were assigned and delivered
to the plaintiffs. (The defense was jurisdictional). Planter's Bank claimed that it
was a corporation of which the State of Georgia and other individuals were mem-
bers. Thus, the defendants argued that the State itself was a party defendant in
the case, removing the suit from the jurisdiction of the lower courts and placing it
within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In delivering the opinion of
the Court, Justice Marshall distinguished the State's role as a governmental entity
from its involvement in private transactions. "It is, we think, a sound principle,
that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it devests it-
self, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign charac-
ter, and takes that of a private citizen." Id. at 907.
67. These policies are comity among nations and separation of powers. See
text accompanying notes 7-17 supra.
68. Of equal importance is the fact that subjecting foreign governments to
the rule of law in commercial dealings presents a much smaller risk of af-
fronting their sovereignty than would an attempt to pass on the legality of
their governmental acts. In their commercial capacities, foreign govern-
ments do not exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns. Instead, they exer-
cise only those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens.
batino's concern of stepping on "national nerves" by judicial in-
terference 69 is therefore not present in the purely commercial
dealings of foreign governments. The concept of comity is not
preserved by shielding those dealings from judicial scrutiny. In
addition, Sabbatino specifically stated that the higher the degree
of "codification or consensus concerning a particular area of inter-
national law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render
decisions regarding it .... -70 According to Dunhill, "discernable
rules of international law have emerged with regard to the com-
mercial dealings of private parties in the international market."7'
Acceptance of the commercial exception would merely be the ap-
plication of these well recognized principles to the commercial ac-
tions of foreign sovereigns. In any event, when entering the realm
of private business, a sovereign state should be held to have im-
pliedly consented to abide by the same rules and regulations
which bind private entities. To permit otherwise would allow gov-
ernmental parties an unconscionable advantage.
The second premise underlying the act of state doctrine is the
concept of "separation of powers."72 Implicit in the separation of
powers argument is the President's power to recognize and nego-
tiate with foreign nations. The judiciary has frequently expressed
its reluctance to interfere in the foreign affairs of the United
States. In addition to the incompetence of the judicial branch in
this area is the concern that a decision of the judiciary may con-
flict with a foreign policy advanced by another branch of the Gov-
ernment.73 This fear of inconsistency is not a viable reason for
the courts to refrain from scrutinizing the commercial acts of for-
eign governments. The executive department, since 1952, has ex-
pressly indicated its approval of the judiciary assuming a larger
role in reviewing the actions of foreign governments. 74 In the
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 703-04 (1976). The
commercial exception would appear to be within the underlying expectations of
the parties in any commercial agreement. In such transactions, each party has the
justifiable expectation that the other will perform his part of the bargain unless
his non-action is somehow "legally excused" (i.e. by impossibility, frustration of
purpose, etc.). Yet to allow a government to enforce an obligation owed to it while
excusing its performance due to its own action, (i.e. governmental acts are a recog-
nized excuse for nonperformance) would be to run afoul of the principle underly-
ing contract law. Such a practice would allow a government to enter contracts at
its choosing and then perform or fail to perform its duties in accordance with its
predilections.
69. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
70. Id. at 428.
71. 425 U.S. at 704.
72. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
73. Id. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
74. In 1952 the State Department issued the Tate letter. See note 60 and ac-
companying text supra.
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Dunhill case, the Department of State specifically advocated a
commercial exception, finding that such an exception would not
interfere with the conduct of foreign relations.75
In addition to the executive encouragement of judicial activism,
it is arguable that commercial matters do not deal with the ideo-
logical and political concerns involved in the recognition of a for-
eign government or the negotiation of a treaty. By definition,
commercial matters are transactional in nature and subject to
rules and practices more attenuated from political concerns. This
idea is best illustrated by the case of Outboard Marine Corp. v.
Pezetel.7 6
In Pezetel, an American manufacturer of electric golf carts
brought an antitrust suit against a Polish manufacturer operating
under the laws of Poland. The Polish manufacturer was in busi-
ness for the purpose of advancing the interest of the State in the
State controlled economy.77 In denying the defendant's argument
the court stated:
The Court cannot agree that this action is the kind contemplated by Jus-
tice Harlan when he wrote 'some aspects of international law touch more
sharply on national nerves than do others! ... [citation omitted] The
sale of goods within the United States is not perceived as impinging on
the political system of Poland.78
But, even if the State of Poland were involved, the court found
that "any political embarrassment appears highly remote since
there can be no genuine insult to sovereignty when a foreign en-
terprise undertaking to do business in a given market place is
subject to the nondiscriminatory laws of that market place." 79
In two recent district court cases,8 0 the Second Circuit's opinion
in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.,81 has been interpreted as accepting
75. Tate letter, reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
425 U.S. 682, 706 app., at 707. "[A]djudications of commercial liability against for-
eign states do not impede the conduct of foreign relations ... such adjudications
are consistent with international law on sovereign immunity." Id.
76. 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. DeL 1978).
77. Id. at 396.
78. Id. at 398.
79. Id.
80. Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp.
680 (SMD.N.Y. 1979), stated there must be a public act such as a legislative enact-
ment, regulatory decree, or executive use of public powers in order to invoke the
act of state doctrine. In Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329
(E.D.N.Y. 1977), the court, while not finding the commercial exception to be "au-
thoritative," deemed it appropriate to examine it since the Second Circuit seemed
to adopt it in Hunt. Id. at 332.
81. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
the commercial acts exception to the doctrine. In Hunt Libya had
nationalized the assets of the plaintiff located in that country.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant oil companies induced
Libya to do so after the plaintiff had entered a contract with the
defendants pursuant to which the plaintiff was to deny Libyan de-
mands to market expropriated oil. The Second Circuit affirmed
the district judge's decision allowing the act of state defense be-
cause nationalization within Libya's own territory was the actual
cause of the damage. 2 The court agreed with the district judge's
opinion that inquiry into "acts and conduct of Libyan officials,
Libyan affairs and Libyan policies. . ." was foreclosed under the
act of state doctrine.8 3 The Second Circuit in Hunt went on to
find, however,
[ejxpropriations of the property of an alien within the boundaries of the
sovereign state are traditionally considered to be public acts of the sover-
eign removed from judicial scrutiny by application of the act of state ru-
bric.... We conclude that the political act complained of here was
clearly within the act of state doctrine .... 84
It is this language that has lead some district courts to embrace
the commercial acts exception to the act of state doctrine.85
The present policy of the courts reveals a "quasi commercial
exception" to the act of state doctrine whereby the courts simply
determine that the acts complained of are not "acts of state."8 6 In
Dunhill, the Court followed this approach, although it also advo-
cated the acceptance of a commercial exception. In Part II of the
82. Id. at 72.
83. Id. at 72 (quoting Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 4, 24 (1975), affd,
550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977)).
84. 550 F.2d at 73.
85. Some district courts have recently accepted the commercial acts exception
advanced in Dunhill. In Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F.
Supp. 396 (D.N.J. 1979), the district judge stated: "The doctrine... distinguishes
between the public and governmental acts of sovereign states and their private
and commercial acts. The doctrine does not preclude me from considering the 're-
pudiation of a purely commercial obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one
of its commercial instrumentalities."' Id. at 401 (quoting in part Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976)).
86. In Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690
(1962), the Canadian Government made a private corporation its exclusive agent
for the purchase of avaladium. The Canadian corporation proceeded to use its po-
sition to exclude an American affiliate from the Canadian market. The Court en-
tertained the suit claiming there was no indication that any Canadian Government
official "approved or would have approved for joint efforts to monopolize." Id. at
706. Thus, by finding that the Canadian Government was not "officially" involved,
the Court was able to circumvent the act of state problem.
In Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 398 (D. DeL 1978), the
court circumvented the issue of a commercial exception to the act of state doctrine
by determining that the action in question was not an "act of state." Id. at 398.
The rationale for this conclusion was the probability that the sovereignty of Po-
land would not be insulted by adjudication of issues surrounding Pezetel's sale of
goods within the United States. Id.
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opinion, Justice White writing for a majority of the Court found
that a mere refusal to pay a commercial debt was not equivalent
to an act of state. Instead of confronting Cuba's actions in the
confiscation, the court avoided that issue by finding that "[njo
statute, decree, order, or resolution of the Cuban Government it-
self was offered in evidence indicating that Cuba had repudiated
its obligations in general. ... 87 The commercial exception alter-
native was introduced only on the assumption that the Cuban
Government had purported to exercise sovereign power to confis-
cate payments belonging to the foreign creditors.88
In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,8 9 the plaintiffs
alleged that the Bank of America sought to remove the competi-
tion of the plaintiffs mill by seeking to disrupt its operations
through the use of a claim against the operations property located
in the Honduras. Pursuant to the filing of suit the property in
question was "embargoed." According to Honduran law, "embar-
goed" property cannot be sold without a court order and an "in-
terventor" must be appointed to ensure against any diminution in
the value of the property. Timberlane alleged that the official ap-
pointed to watch over the mill was on the payroll of the Bank and
was acting in the interest of the Bank in attempting to disrupt
and close the mill.0 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied a
narrow definition of the act of state doctrine. The court found
that acts of state require a public interest qualification, and there
was "no indication that the actions of the Honduran court and au-
thorities reflected a sovereign decision that Timberlane's efforts
should be crippled or that trade with the United States should be
restrained."91
An analysis of each of the foregoing cases suggests two facets.
First, if the court wishes to review the actions of a foreign govern-
ment in a commercial matter it need only apply a strict definition
of "act of state" and thus deny the action its sovereign status. In
so doing, the court is left to decide the case on the merits and
need not concern itself with the prohibitions of the act of state de-
fense. Second, implicit in the court's decision to apply this strict
definition is a recognition of a form of commercial exception. Un-
87. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976).
88. Id.
89. 549 F.2d 597 (1976).
90. Id. at 604-05.
91. Id. at 608.
less the foreign sovereign enters into the marketplace to advance
a legitimate "public interest," its acts can be classified as "pri-
vate" and denied protection of the act of state defense.
The distinction between this quasi-commercial exception and a
true commercial exception is the emphasis on the purpose, as op-
posed to the nature of the act itself. Where a strict definition of
act of state is applied to delete "private" acts from coverage of the
defense, the focus is on the purpose of the act. Acts for the pur-
pose of promoting the public interest of the state will remain pro-
tected by the doctrine.92
In comparison, a true commercial exception would focus on the
nature of the act in question. Whether the purpose of the act was
to advance public or private interests, if its nature were commer-
cial, it would be denied the shield of the act of state doctrine.
Consequentially, in focusing on the nature of the sovereign's acts,
the coverage of the defense is more restricted. In addition, the
latter approach seems more conducive to consistent application,
foregoing the necessity of inquiring into the motivation of the for-
eign governments' actions.
One commentator cites the situation of a sovereign acting in a
dual capacity as necessitating a commercial exception to the act
of state doctrine.93 For example, consider a nation which imposes
an embargo due to its own shortage of goods which necessarily
"has the effect of abrogating that nation's commitments to deliver
contracted-for commodities." 94 The purpose of such an act is pub-
lic and, therefore, the act is definitionally an "act of state." Under
the broader commercial exception, those parties injured by the
acts of the sovereign would have redress in court.
The traditional application of the act of state doctrine also nulli-
fies the intent and effect of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(F.S.I.A.).95 The passage of the F.S.I.A. in 1976 codified the re-
strictive approach to sovereign immunity first advanced by the
State Department in 1952.96 The doctrine of sovereign immunity
92. Thus, one can distinguish 'mere foreign governmental involvement from
true acts of state. An act of state is the means by which the foreign government
gives effect to its national interests, and such an act remains a complete defense to
alleged violations of U.S. law." 18 VA. J. INT'L LAW. 321, 324 (1978). See also Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 81 Daily J. D.A.R.
2249, 2250 n.6 (U.S.C.A. 9th, July 6, 1981).
93. Friedman & Blau, Formulating a Commercial Exception to the Act of State
Doctrine: Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 50 ST. JoHN's L. REV.
666 (1976).
94. Id. at 682.
95. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611
(1976).
96. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
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precludes the assertion of subject matter jurisdiction in situations
where a foreign state is involved, whereas the act of state doctrine
operates as a defense to inquiry into the acts of a foreign sover-
eign. Nevertheless, the historical foundations of sovereign immu-
nity and the act of state doctrine are common and reveal parallel
purposes.
Both doctrines arose early in our judicial history when court de-
cisions reflected the prevailing notions of the inherent supremacy
of respective sovereigns. The development of these concepts can
be traced to Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,97 where Chief Jus-
tice Marshall distinguished between the private and public acts of
a sovereign.9 8 From this common historical nucleus the respec-
tive doctrines developed similar rationales and effects. Thus, as
in Ricaud,9 9 though the doctrines were clearly distinguished,
their aims are similar.
As with the act of state doctrine, sovereign immunity has a
strong foundation in the concept of separation of powers. In Mex-
ico v. Hoffman,100 the Supreme Court unanimously denied immu-
nity to a commercial ship owned but not possessed by the
Mexican Government. Although the decision turned upon the
lack of possession by the Mexican Government, the Court stated
one of the basic premises underlying the sovereign immunity
doctrine:
[Ilt is a guiding principle in determining whether a court should exercise
or surrender its jurisdiction... that the courts should not so act as to em-
barrass the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs. "In such cases
the judicial department ... follows the action of the political branch, and
will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction."1 01
Thus, as with the Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine,
the courts have, in applying the sovereign immunity doctrine,
looked to the State Department policies so as not to assume an
"antagonistic jurisdiction." In Compania Espanola de Navegacion
Maritima, S.A. v. Navemar0 2 and Ex parte Republic of Peru,0 3
Justice Stone, the author of both opinions, stated that the touch-
stone for the sovereign immunity doctrine was not whether sub-
97. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
98. Id. at 143.
99. See notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra.
100. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
101. Id. at 35 (citations omitted).
102. 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
103. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
stantive international law concepts were applied, but what effect
judicial action would have on the foreign relations of the United
States. 04 Stone acknowledged the superior expertise of the State
Department in determining whether the denial of sovereign im-
munity would harm the United States' relations with foreign sov-
ereigns.105 In a tone reminiscent of Sabbatino, Justice Stone
discussed the greater diplomatic capabilities of the executive
branch which make that branch more productive in settling for-
eign disputes.106 With these considerations in mind, the judiciary
advocated a duty to abstain from adjudication when the State De-
partment felt that such action would adversely affect United
States foreign relations.107
The modern notions of a restrictive sovereign immunity doc-
trine stem from Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General.0 8
In this case, there was a charter between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant to arbitrate in accordance with a clause in the charter.
The defendant asserted a sovereign immunity defense. In reach-
ing its decision, the Second Circuit considered the State Depart-
ment's position as contained in the Tate letter. 09 An analysis of
the Tate letter reveals three reasons behind the State Department
policy in support of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
First, the Department felt that the trend in international law re-
vealed a growing acceptance of the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity by other nations.l1o Second, the granting of a blanket
immunity to other nations would be inconsistent with the action
of the United States in "subjecting itself to suit in these same
courts in both contract and tort" for its foreign merchant ves-
sels."'1 Third, the Department felt that "widespread and increas-
ing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial
activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons
doing business with them to have their rights determined in the
courts."'
1 2
The effect of the Tate letter was to create an instability between
the judicial policy of a broad theory of sovereign immunity, and
104. Id. at 586-88.
105. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943); Compania Espanola de
Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938).
106. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
107. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943); Compania Espanola de
Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938).
108. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
109. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
110. Tate letter, reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
425 U.S. 682, 706 app., 711 (1976).
111. Id. at 714.
112. Id.
[VoL 18: 813, 1981] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the executive department's advocacy of a restrictive doctrine. In
order to alleviate these inconsistencies, the F.S.I.A. was enacted.
The F.S.I.A. has three purposes. First, to codify the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity as was then recognized in interna-
tional law. This would grant immunity only to public acts ("jure
imperi") as opposed to commercial or private acts ("jure ge-
tionis").113 Second, to transfer responsibility for evaluating
claims of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the ju-
diciary.n 4 Third, to provide a statutory procedure for serving pro-
cess on and acquiring jurisdiction over a foreign state." 5
In implementing the aforementioned purposes of the Act, Sec-
tion 1605(a) of the United States Code details the types of activi-
ties which expose a foreign sovereign to jurisdiction within the
courts of the United States. Included in these activities are "com-
mercial acts."" 6 In determining what constitutes a "commercial
act" Section 1603 suggests that the determination should hinge
upon the nature of the act rather than its purpose."17
In essence, the Act reflects the adoption of the "restrictive" the-
ory of sovereign immunity, thereby requiring that the courts hear
matters in which another government acts in a commercial capac-
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
114. The legislative history of the Immunities Act revealed this specifically rec-
ognized objective stating
A principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sover-
eign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby
reducing the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and
assuring litigants that these often crucial decisions are made on purely le-
gal grounds and under procedures that insure due process.
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 6604, 6606.
115. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1976). "A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case ... (2) in
which the action is based upon a commercial activity. .. ." Id.
117. "A 'commercial activity' means either a regular course of commercial con-
duct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of
an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct
or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603 (1976) (emphasis added).
The legislative history of the Act reveals that the bottom line in distinguishing
between public and private acts turns upon whether the action taken could have
been taken by a private person. 'Thus, a contract by a foreign government to buy
provisions or equipment for its armed forces or to construct a government building
constitutes a commercial activity ... Such contract should be considered to be
commercial contract, even if their ultimate object is to further a public function."
H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. Nnws 6604.
ity. Furthermore, the Act establishes the judiciary as the final ar-
biter of these matters. Thus, under the F.S.I.A. the judiciary is
thrust into assuming a leading role in the arbitration of interna-
tional commercial disputes. Both the wording and the history be-
hind the act reveal a strong commitment by Congress to divorce
the political pressures involved in foreign affairs from the com-
mercial transactions amongst the individuals and nations of the
international community.
Having codified the State Department's concept of sovereign
immunity, its application and effect upon the act of state doctrine
remains a matter of interpretation. In adopting the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, the F.S.I.A. created a wide discrep-
ancy between the effect and practices of the sovereign immunity
and the act of state doctrines. A foreign sovereign acting in a
commercial capacity, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States courts under the F.S.I.A., may still invoke the act of state
defense to preclude adjudication.
In Dunhill, Justice White examined the development and pur-
poses of these two doctrines and concluded that the act of state
could not be given a broad construction and remain consistent
with the commercial exception embodied in the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity.118 Thus, in seeking to reunite the doc-
trines Justice White concluded: "[W] e hold that the mere asser-
tion of sovereignty as a defense to a claim arising out of purely
commercial acts by a foreign sovereign is no more effective if
given the label 'Act of State' than if it is given the label 'sovereign
immunity.' "119
Nevertheless, the reconciliation of the sovereign immunity con-
cept and the act of state doctrine is ultimately a question of inter-
pretation. The dissent in Dunhill spent a considerable amount of
effort articulating the distinction between these doctrines; "The
act of state doctrine, 'although it shares with the immunity doc-
trine a respect for sovereign states,' serves important policies en-
tirely independent of that rule."120
118. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698-99
(1976).
119. Id. at 705.
120. Id. at 726 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The Ninth Circuit in International Machinists v. OPEC, Daily J. D.A.R. 2249-50
(U.S. CA. 9th, July 6,1981), also emphasized the distinctions between the two doc-
trines. The court asserted that the "act of state doctrine is not diluted by the com-
mercial activity exception which limits the doctrine of sovereign immunity." Id.
This is because the Ninth Circuit interpretation of the act of state doctrine focuses
on the purpose of the action, regardless of its commercial nature. But there was
no discussion of the effects of the traditional application of the act of state doc-
trine on the F.S.LA. Perhaps the court felt such a discussion unnecessary because
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The crux of these "independent policies" is that the act of state
doctrine reflects a political question which is not cognizable in the
courts, while the sovereign immunity doctrine deals only with the
status of a party to the suit.1 2 1 The dissent thus felt that the
many considerations which the court enunciated in Sabbatino
would not have an effect on sovereign immunity and vice versa.
To accept this premise, however, and yet construe the act of state
defense to include commercial activities is to acknowledge a grant
of jurisdiction in theory and deny its application in practice. In
addition, the Dunhill dissent is somewhat weakened by its timing.
At the time of the decision, the restrictive theory of sovereign im-
munity was merely a trend which had not been codified by the
legislature nor recognized by the court. As such, the decision by
White relied heavily on the State Department's letter of go-ahead.
The portion of White's opinion in Dunhill which advocates the
adoption of a commercial exception to the act of state doctrine
was supported by only three other Justices. That portion of the
opinion also may be viewed as mere dicta in the case. Prior to an-
nouncing the commercial exception, a majority of the Court had
concluded that the acts involved were not sovereign acts.1 22
Today, the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity is clearly
articulated by the F.S.I.A. Consistent with its policy of deference
in foreign affairs, the court should support the commercial excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine. Such a result is necessitated by
the separation of powers principles underlying both doctrines.
For the court to decide otherwise would result in abrogation of
the intent of the legislative and executive branches in the form of
the F.S.LA.
Another rationale in support of excluding antitrust cases from
the act of state doctrine is based in the nature of antitrust viola-
tions. An act of state by definition is limited to acts by foreign
sovereigns committed within their territory. The language of the
Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez'23 clearly reflects the
its application was not traditional. In its consideration of factors beyond a public
interest, it does not appear that the finding of a public interest will always provide
the shield of act of state.
121. Id. at 727 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Marshall and the dissent-
ers felt that the "political nature" of the act of state doctrine should turn upon the
factors enunciated in Sabbatino while sovereign immunity was not designed to be
responsive to these considerations.
122. 425 U.S. at 694-95.
123. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
territorial limitation embodied in the rule: "[T]he courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another done within its own territory."24 In contrast, violations
of United States antitrust laws by a foreign sovereign are extra-
territorial in nature.
The modern act of state doctrine as announced in Sabbatino25
involved a situation in which the acts complained of were particu-
larly local in character. A review of the case reveals that the terri-
torial concern was crucial in the Court's decision and rationale.
Essentially, the recognition of a foreign sovereign's acts within its
territory was considered tantamount to the recognition of the for-
eign sovereign itself "since the concept of territorial sovereignty
is so deep seated, any state may resent the refusal of the courts of
another sovereign to accord validity to acts within its territorial
borders."126
Dunhill exposes the first rift in the concept of territoriality.127
The Court did not directly address the question of whether the
act of state doctrine was solely a question of territorial comity.
The division of the Court reflects the difference of opinion con-
cerning the labeling of the actions as an "expropriation decree" or
merely a "repudiation of a commercial obligation." The majority
opinion by Justice White found the act of Cuba was merely a re-
pudiation of a commercial debt.128 The dissent accepted the argu-
ment advanced by Cuba's counsel that the act complained of was
entirely non-commercial in character since it was an expropria-
124. Id. at 252. (emphasis added).
125. See notes 30-46 and accompanying text supra.
126. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432 (1964). In Sabba-
tino, the acts complained of involved the confiscation of property by the govern-
ment within its borders. Implicit in such actions are the division of political and
ideological factors which underlie such confiscations. The Court in Sabbatino was
well aware that Cuba and many other communist countries often resorted to simi-
lar measures as the first acts of statehood and independence. The Sabbatino
Court noted that there were few areas more replete with differing perspectives
and ideological debate. "However, Communistic countries, although they have in
fact provided a degree of compensation after diplomatic efforts, commonly recog-
nize no obligation on the part of the taking country." Id. at 429. In view of these
antecedents, the Court was extremely reluctant to enter an arena which included
such problematic issues as American imperialism and the rights of self determina-
tion among emerging nations. Asserting jurisdiction could only lower the prestige
and viability of American courts. Faced with these alternatives, the Court con-
cluded: "It is difficult to imagine the courts of this country embarking on adjudica-
tion in an area which touches more sensitively the practical and ideological goals
of the various members of the community of nations." Id. at 430.
127. See notes 54-75 and accompanying text supra.
128. "Nothing in our national policy calls on us to recognize as an act of state a
repudiation by Cuba of an obligation adjudicated in our courts and arising out of
the operation of a commercial business by one of its instrumentalities." Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 705 (1976). See also notes
58-68 and accompanying text supra.
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tion decree. 129
This split in perspective may be instrumental in explaining the
split decision of the Court. If the matter involved had not arisen
in the context of a recent social revolution, tainted with numerous
political ramifications, the dissent may have been more limited or
perhaps even obviated. In view of the circumstances of the case,
the dissent felt compelled to follow the footsteps of Sabbatino,130
and determined that the division of opinion and political rift in-
volved in the case precluded judicial scrutiny.
Decisions in the appellate and federal district courts subse-
quent to Dunhill evidence a growing judicial awareness of the ter-
ritorial limits of the act of state doctrine and the parallel
expansion of jurisdiction in antitrust matters. In Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,131 the court examined the act of
state doctrine and found a distinction between confiscatory de-
crees by a sovereign and antitrust litigation:
In the typical confiscation situation based on a foreign state's expropria-
tion of property rights or its repudiation of contractual obligations, only
private rights are sought to be vindicated. In antitrust litigation, however,
in addition to claims of private injury, there is a public interest in clearing
monopolistic activities from the channels of American commerce.132
Mannington is important in that it notes the judicial distinction
between acts of a state committed solely within the territory of
that state and those where the effects of the sovereign acts are in-
tended to be extraterritorial. Through this type of analysis the
court is able to distinguish the separation of powers restrictions
of Sabbatino in order to consider the more salient issues involved
in such cases. In essence, the court refused to automatically ap-
ply those restrictions under the rubric of an act of state. Instead,
all considerations relevant to the case were to be weighed to de-
termine whether jurisdiction should be exercised.133
129. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. at 721-27.
Cuba's retention of and refusal to repay the funds at issue in this case
took place against the background of the intervention, or nationalization
of the businesses and assets of five cigar manufacturers .... The seizure
of the funds ... reflected a purpose to exert sovereign power to its terri-
torial limits in order to effectuate the intervention of ongoing cigar manu-
facturing businesses.
Id. at 729.
130. See notes 30-46 and accompanying text supra.
131. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
132. Id. at 1293.
133. Id. at 1298.
In United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic International Co.,134 the Second
Circuit refused to accept the plaintiffs claim that the situs of the
debt at issue was in Bangladesh. The court in this manner denied
an act of state shield to an extraterritorial seizure by Bangladesh.
"Where an act of state has not 'come to complete fruition within
the dominion of... (a foreign) government,' [citation omitted]
no fait accompli has occurred which would otherwise effectively
prevent an American court from reviewing the act's validity."135
By failing to find a fait accompli in Bangladesh, the court was
able to use the Sabbatino rationale to determine that the ensuing
judicial review would not likely jeopardize the foreign relations of
this country.
An examination of the concepts of territoriality reveals that the
act of state doctrine is vulnerable to an antitrust exception. Dun-
hill and its progeny have sought to limit the doctrine to acts aris-
ing and having their effects within the territorial confines of the
foreign sovereign. Furthermore, it is clear that the modern con-
troversies involving the act of state doctrine have arisen in fact
situations in which the court has had to shape its decree in ac-
cordance with political exigencies. Thus, the development of the
doctrine has been retarded by factors which should not arise in
commercial transactions. Normally, antitrust violations do not
have the ideological and political impact found in expropriation
cases; and, as illustrated in Cosmic Intern, antitrust violations do
not come to "complete fruition" until they have some effect on
U.S. commerce. Such acts would clearly seem to fall outside the
"territorial" restrictions envisioned by Underhill and Sabbatino.
THE TIMBERLANE ANALYSIS ADEQUATELY COMPREHENDS THE
INTERESTS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING
THE ACT OF STATE DocTRINE
As previously discussed, the cases involving act of state
problems reveal that the modern basis of the doctrine is separa-
tion of powers. Essentially, the question is jurisdictional: how far
should the American courts extend their jurisdiction beyond the
territorial borders of the United States?
The leading case involving extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction
is United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa).136 The
opinion represented the first declaration that the Sherman Act
prohibited agreements restricting international trade if "they
were intended to affect imports and did affect" imports into the
134. 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976).
135. Id. at 874.
136. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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United States. 137 Yet, in construing the "effects" test, Judge
Learned Hand left unanswered just what type and magnitude of
"effect" would sustain jurisdiction. Furthermore, in focusing
solely on the effects on United States imports, the court left open
various political and international policy considerations which are
often crucial to the court's jurisdictional determinations.138
Timberlane reflects an attempt by the judiciary to assimilate
the concepts of extraterritoriality and act of state into a coherent,
rational approach. As mentioned earlier, Timberlane arose as the
result of collusive acts of the Bank of America and a Honduran
official in seeking to interfere in and disrupt the operations of the
plaintiff. Although the Ninth Circuit analyzed the act of state doc-
trine and found that it was not involved, the core issue of the case
was the nature and extent to which a United States court could
extend its jurisdiction. In examining Alcoa and its progeny, the
court determined that: "An effect on United States commerce, al-
though necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction under the anti-
trust laws, is alone not a sufficient basis on which to determine
whether American authority should be asserted in a given case as
a matter of international comity and fairness."139
In determining the extent of United States' jurisdiction, the
court felt that the considerations underlying the act of state doc-
trine should be extended to problems of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion. The result of this analysis is the 'jurisdictional rule of
reason," which suggests a triparte analysis.
Initially, there must be some effect, either actual or intended
"on American foreign commerce before the federal courts may le-
gitimately exercise subject matter jurisdiction .... "140 Secondly,
there must be an analysis of the burden involved. A "greater
showing of burden or restraint may be necessary to demonstrate
that the effect is sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to
the plaintiffs and; therefore, a civil violation of the antitrust
laws."14' Thirdly, there is a consideration unique to the interna-
137. Id. at 444.
138. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 611-12 (9th
Cir. 1976). 'The effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider
other nations' interests. Nor does it expressly take into account the full nature of
the relationship between the actors and this country." Id See also notes 89-91
and accompanying text supra.
139. 549 F.2d at 613.
140. Id.
141. Id.
tional setting. This is "whether the interests of, and links to, the
United States-including the magnitude of the effect on American
foreign commerce-are sufficiently strong, vis-A-vis those of other
nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority."4 2
This last consideration is essentially a balancing process by
which the judiciary measures the competing claims of the coun-
tries involved. It is this step which comprises the aims and goals
of the act of state doctrine.
In balancing the international considerations involved in extra-
territorial jurisdiction, the court included a number of factors.
First, the "degree of conflict with foreign law or policy ... ,"143
This is a restatement of Sabbatino's discussion regarding deci-
sions which affect "national nerves" in the context of an act of
state determination.144 Second, the "extent to which enforcement
... can be expected to achieve compliance .... 14 5 This factor is
a measure of the feasibility of jurisdiction. The court is determin-
ing whether other departments of government would be more ef-
fective. This is similar to the Sabbatino proposition that the most
effective relief for act of state problems is through diplomatic
rather than judicial channels.146 Unlike Sabbatino, the
Timberlane court did not attempt to determine which branch of
government should provide relief, but left the question to turn
upon the particular facts of the case. Third, the "relative signifi-
cance of effects on the United States as compared with those else-
where .... '"147 This factor adequately comprehends issues
relating to the extraterritorial nature of the act. The "effect" of an
expropriation by a foreign sovereign on U.S. commerce, for exam-
ple, would be comparatively minimal.
In balancing the foreign interests involved, the Timberlane
analysis permits a court to determine whether the policies under-
lying the act of state doctrine should be invoked to bar jurisdic-
tion. Inherent in the Ninth Circuit's articulation of the various
factors relevant to an exercise of jurisdiction is an attempt to elu-
cidate the concerns underlying the act of state doctrine.
This approach was applied in the context of the act of state doc-
trine in the recent Ninth Circuit decision of International Machin-
ist v. OPEC.148 There, the Ninth Circuit made it clear that they
142. Id.
143. Id. at 614.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
147. 549 F.2d at 614.
148. 81 Daily J. D.A.R. 2249 (U.S.C.A. 9th, July 6, 1981). Members of the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers alleged the price-setting
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had no inclination to create a commercial exception to the act of
state doctrine. Rather, the Ninth Circuit adopted a definition of
act of state based on the purpose of the sovereign's actions. 149
Where those actions have a public interest factor the act of state
doctrine may be applicable.150
The court went further than merely considering the sovereign
purpose. The "potential for interference with our foreign rela-
tions" was cited as a "crucial element" in the decision to allow the
act of state defense.151 The international relations involved in the
world energy crisis and the "possibility of insult to OPEC states
and of interference with the efforts of the political branches" were
factors important to the allowance of the defense in International
Machinists.152
A third consideration cited by the Ninth Circuit was the "availa-
bility of internationally-accepted legal principles", a factor ini-
tially enunciated in Sabbatino.153 The absence of any
"international consensus condeming cartels, royalties, and pro-
duction agreements" lent further support to the court's decision
to allow the act of state defense to OPEC.54
The language in International Machinists was carefully chosen.
The court never said the existence of a public interest would re-
quire the application of the act of state doctrine. Rather, such
public interest merely requires the courts to "proceed cautiously
to avoid an affront to that sovereignty.". 5 The Ninth Circuit
repeated Sabbatino's preference for a balancing approach rather
than a "rigid rule of application."15 6 Thus the possibility of inter-
ference with foreign relations and the lack of international con-
sensus in the area of law are factors to be considered "in addition
to" the public interest factor.15 7 Much of the language in Interna-
tional Machinist is reminiscent of the Sabbatino decision.
activities of OPEC violated the United States antitrust laws. The decision of the
district court in favor of the defendants (OPEC) was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit
under the rubric of the act of state doctrine. Id. at 2249.
149. See notes 89-94 and accompanying text supra.
150. 81 Daily J. D.R. at 2250.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
154. 81 Daily J. DAR. at 2250.
155. Id.
156. Id. See also notes 41-46 and accompanying text supra.
157. 81 Daily J. DAR. at 2250.
The Timberlane, International Machinists approach calls for an
evaluation of the competing governmental interests involved and
of the international implications of exercising jurisdiction. A sim-
ilar approach which resulted in disallowance of the act of state
defense was used in Industrial Investment Development Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co. ' 5 8 The case involved an antitrust action against a
foreign corporation and its American subsidiary.
In refusing to apply the act of state doctrine, the Fifth Circuit
held that the participation of the Indonesian Government, by re-
fusing to issue a license to the plaintiff, did not bar adjudica-
tion. 5 9 Timberlane was cited by the Fifth Circuit in support of its
decision. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Mannington160
was in "substantial agreement" with the analysis of Timberlane
and remanded the case to the district court for preparation of a
record which was comprehensive enough for evaluation of the rel-
evant factors.161 The Seventh Circuit in Westinghouse Electric
Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd.,162 in citing Timberlane's jurisdictional
rule of reason, noted that it was not inconsistent with their own
determination. 63
The Timberlane analysis reflects an attempt by the judiciary to
come to grips with many of the ambiguous concepts which have
continually plagued the exraterritorial jurisdiction of American
courts. Through concepts such as act of state the judiciary has
been able to assert or decline jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis. The
problems inherent in such an approach are readily apparent.
With each case decided on its facts, the courts fail to conduct an
appropriate evaluation of the interests involved. With such a
standardless approach, the courts may choose to hide behind the
158. 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980).
159. Id.
160. See notes 131-33 and accompanying text supra.
161. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir.
1979).
162. 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
163. Id. at 1255.
Both Westinghouse and Timberlane involved suits by American companies
against domestic and foreign corporations for alleged antitrust violations taking
place abroad. The Westinghouse controversy, however, was distinguished from
Timberlane. Although both involved similar fact patterns and alleged antitrust vi-
olations, the district court in Westinghouse had determined the act of state doc-
trine was not a bar, whereas in Timberlane, another district court had allowed the
defense. Therefore, the decision of the circuit court in Westinghouse was confined
to whether the district judge had abused his discretion in deciding to proceed. 617
F.2d at 1255. The Seventh Circuit held he had not. It was recognized that the dis-
trict judge had used factors different from those advanced in Timberlane and Man-
n ington. In affirming the decision, the court reasoned that because the defendants
had defaulted in Westinghouse and not presented evidence against the exercise of
jurisdiction, it would be fruitless to remand the case on the issue of jurisdiction.
Id. at 1256.
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screen created by the act of state doctrine and thus avoid deci-
sions which they consider too volatile. Yet, this self-protection-
ism may result in the inequities which our judicial system was
designed to prevent.
In retrospect, the act of state doctrine, with its bases in comity
and separation of powers concepts, is concerned with the inter-
ests of the United States and those of the foreign government.
The strengths and weaknesses of these respective interests ulti-
mately determine the jurisdictional outcome of the case. In
Timberlane these interests are clearly articulated and developed.
Thus, the determination made pursuant to the Timberlane analy-
sis should preclude act of state considerations from obfuscating
the truly relevant issues.
CONCLUSION
While the F.S.I.A. grants jurisdiction to the United States courts
in situations where the foreign government is acting in a commer-
cial capacity, it continues to allow the defense of the act of state
doctrine under the same circumstances. Due to this anomalous
result, the argument in support of a commercial exception to the
act of state doctrine is persuasive. Essentially, this was the argu-
ment accepted by four members of the Court in Dunhill.64
The argument in support of a commercial exception to the act
of state doctrine in antitrust cases is buttressed by three distinct
rationales. First, an "act of state" by definition excludes commer-
cial dealings from its purview.165 Second, the present application
of the act of state doctrine nullifies the intent and effect of the
F.S.I.A.166 Third, the act of state doctrine is by definition limited
to acts by foreign sovereigns committed within their own terri-
tory. 67 Foreign states' violations of United States antitrust laws
are by their nature extraterritorial.168
An alternative to the adoption of a commercial exception is the
approach of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Timberlane.
Timberlane reflects an attempt to assimilate the purposes under-
lying the act of state doctrine into a jurisdictional determination.
164. 425 U.S. at 705-06.
165. See notes 63-135 and accompanying text supra.
166. See notes 95-122 and accompanying text supra.
167. See notes 123-35 and accompanying text supra.
168. See notes 133 and accompanying text supra.
The Timberlane approach is an attempt to provide guidelines in
the exercise of jurisdiction in situations where foreign govern-
ments are involved. This approach takes into account the pur-
poses and premises of the act of state doctrine without bestowing
an absolute defense on the foreign government.
The increasing participation of foreign governments in commer-
cial endeavors mandates abrogation of the absolute defense of act
of state for the harmful consequences ensuing from those endeav-
ors. The mechanism might be a judicially created commercial ex-
ception to the act of state doctrine, or a balancing approach akin
to that in Timberlane. A blanket immunity such as the act of
state defense, allows the foreign sovereign an unconscionable ad-
vantage over private entities in the marketplace. Permitting the
United States courts to scrutinize commercial dealings of foreign
states in antitrust controversies will tend to limit the inequities
inherent in the present application of the act of state doctrine.
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